Adam Lee's absolute and objective morality for atheists

Following the spirited debate between Dinesh D'Souza and Christopher Hitchens not all that long ago, I found the time to seek out some reactions to the debate. One of those was the reaction of atheist Adam Lee, who also goes by the pseudonym "Ebonmuse."

I offered a critique of Lee's critique, to which he responded here. Lee offered to refer me to an essay that would answer my observation that he had not offered any explanation for the atheistic moral system he recommends.

Days later, Lee has yet to point me to the essay (though I'm over 90 percent sure he has visited the site in the interim). Rather than continue to wait on him, I searched out the essay to which he probably referred.

The Ineffable Carrot and the Infinite Stick
An atheist's view of morality

(Ebon Musings)

Based on the quality of the argument, I can see why Lee might show a reluctance to link to the essay. On the other hand, I can probably rule out any strong streak of humility on his part based on the essay. Lee serially trashes past attempts by notable thinkers to establish morality on a metaphysical basis other than a god or gods before offering his own attempt to synthesize their work into a shiny and coherent whole.

On Rand: " ... to find a workable universal moral code, we must look elsewhere."

On Aristotle: "Aristotelian ethics, though they are not inherently flawed, lack foundation; they are "floating free" without sufficient justification."

On Rousseau: "... we must delve deeper to find the true foundation of ethical behavior."

On Kant: "A system so manifestly in error cannot serve as the basis for a universal moral system ..."

On Spencer: "... no moral system can escape the fact that observation of facts alone can never produce an ethical 'ought'."

On Bentham: "A satisfactory ethical code should be able to derive that idea from first principles rather than tacking it on in an ad hoc fashion."

On Rawls: "... its main flaw is not a theoretical but a practical one: his proposal is and forever will be a thought experiment only."

Lee has his work cut out for him. His essay asserts the existence of "one true absolute, objective, universal moral code" (emphasis in the original), and promises that he will establish its foundation. He then reviews game theory with the Prisoner's Dilemma before indulging in the fault-finding I summarized above. The latter portions of part IV introduce "Moral Popperianism" and "Universal Utilitarianism," which appear intended to deliver on the promise of the essay.

Under "Grasping for the Good," Lee commits an error at least as fatal as any of those he found in the arguments of others. He asserts that pragmatism serves as an important criterion for a coherent moral system, then bungles the concept. After properly noting that the system should not lead to contradiction (the real key to coherence and thus the pragmatic ideal he should have in mind), Lee somehow gets the notion confused with the resulting outcome of the system.

Likewise, this principle removes from consideration systems such as communism, which pays all people the same amount and then expects them all to labor their hardest to benefit society. It is unrealistic to expect such a system to work as long as human nature remains unchanged. Finally, the pragmatic principle leads us to reject any moral code that proposes, for example, the legalization of murder or theft. Any society that tried this would soon collapse into chaos.

Lee has done nothing less than allow a moral precept to insinuate itself into his system as a premise. Societies ought not fall into chaos, therefore Lee tries to design his system to avoid falling short of that ideal. If Lee never gets around to providing the foundation for that particular ought, then he will assuredly fail to live up to the claim he made at the beginning of his essay.

With "Moral Popperianism": An Ethical Stepping Stone," Lee makes his attempt to cross the is/ought divide. Lee sticks to his slow-starting ways in locating the inauspicious introduction to his big step near the middle of the section: "(W)hile it is true that moral directives cannot be derived from the bare facts of the external world, they are still based on those facts, and therein lies the key."

Do tell.

"(T)he principle which I call moral Popperianism is this: any ethical directive based on a false factual statement is wrong." (emphasis in the original)

I could not make head nor tail of this without the subsequent example. We had already established, I thought, the problem of the is/ought dichotomy. Now we have the isn't/ought dichotomy to worry about as well. I'm honestly not sure why we trouble ourselves with the latter. I suspect it has something to do with anti-theism.

With our sure foundation of a question-begging premise combined with the isn't/ought dichotomy, we move on to "Universal Utilitarianism."

"Universal Utilitarianism" ends up as another excuse to make a moral precept foundational to the moral system.

What is the ultimate aim of morality? What state does it seek to bring about?

The answer to this should, I hope, be obvious: the goal of morality is to ensure happiness. All people want to be happy, and everything else which they desire is ultimately just a means to that end. The means by which people seek happiness are so varied that any other attempt at generalization would be futile, but the desire for happiness is the one true universal which unites all these disparate paths.

Some ethical systems attempt to camouflage the point where they switch from "is" language to "ought" language. I will not do this, but rather state it plainly: in general, people ought to be happy. I hold this proposition to be axiomatic and foundational, and I further hold that any ethical system that has as its highest aim something other than producing happiness is completely missing the point. In short, this developing ethical system will be a form of utilitarianism.

I don't understand how somebody can criticize Bentham, Kant and the others and then promptly beg the whole question as Lee does above. Is the critic permitted to ask on what basis this ought is made axiomatic when we were promised so much more ("This essay will present answers to these questions and others")? Lee's answer smacks of Mr. Garrison's rationale for not doing drugs ("Drugs are bad, mkay?").

I believe I have come up with a new variant of utilitarian moral theory that avoids the flaws of both act and rule utilitarianism, which I call universal utilitarianism. It can be summed up in a single sentence, and without further ado, here it is:

Always minimize both actual and potential suffering; always maximize both actual and potential happiness.

I offer this foundational principle as the base of a new objective ethical system.

Lee's "foundation" for his ethical system is an ethical precept. He has built a floating system, as did Aristotle, but he apparently gives himself a pass on the same criticism.

In the following paragraphs, I will "unpack" universal utilitarianism and hopefully show how it surmounts the problems that have stymied so many other ethical codes.

Great! I can't wait!

It is first and foremost a form of utilitarianism, and like other forms of utilitarianism, as well as Aristotelian virtue ethics, it identifies happiness as the highest good, worth acquiring for its own sake and by the very nature of what it is.

And that's it. As far as I can tell, Lee simply acknowledges the similarity to Aristotle's system without lifting a finger to explain how his system avoids the problem he admitted with Aristotle's system. It's almost like putting his own name on the ideas of others makes them immune to what might have been legitimate criticisms.

How about Lee's own perversion of the principle of pragmatism? Is it true that humans ought to be happy? We can't base our morality on something that is not known to be true, can we?



The essay contained a great deal more material than what I've addressed here, though of comparable quality to the parts I've critiqued. Lee's essay contains (what should be) obvious flaws and can't be taken seriously.

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Solving an atheist's dilemma?

Given my interest in the moral dimension of the debates between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza (and Alister McGrath), I was delighted to stumble across an attempted solution to the atheist's ethical problem at "Daylight Atheism" in a post apparently by Adam/ebonmuse.

I'm not going to reproduce the entire thing, as the argument itself should be fairly compact.

You worried that atheists have no compelling answer to a person who says, "I'm going to do whatever I please." But religion does not solve that problem. If anything, the problem is far worse ...
(Daylight Atheism)

Adam's argument is presented as a response to an editorial by Michael Gerson, the "You" in the first line. This isn't likely to be the argument, but if it were then it is nothing more than a tu quoque fallacy, the technique of excusing one failing by taking note of the same or a similar failing on the part of the opponent. No need to linger on this, I trust.

Unfortunately the gist of Adam's argument apparently occurs in the following slippery (in the mercurial sense) paragraph.

You asked what reason an atheist can give to be moral, so allow me to offer an answer. You correctly pointed out that neither our instincts nor our self-interest can completely suffice, but there is another possibility you've overlooked. Call it what you will - empathy, compassion, conscience, lovingkindness - but the deepest and truest expression of that state is the one that wishes everyone else to share in it. A happiness that is predicated on the unhappiness of others - a mentality of "I win, you lose" - is a mean and petty form of happiness, one hardly worthy of the name at all. On the contrary, the highest, purest and most lasting form of happiness is the one which we can only bring about in ourselves by cultivating it in others. The recognition of this truth gives us a fulcrum upon which we can build a consistent, objective theory of human morality. Acts that contribute to the sum total of human happiness in this way are right, while those that have the opposite effect are wrong. A wealth of moral guidelines can be derived from this basic, rational principle.

This answer fell well short of my extremely well tempered expectations.

On what basis does Adam distinguish between "instinct" and "empathy, compassion, conscience, lovingkindness - but the deepest and truest expression of that state is the one that wishes everyone else to share in it"? By all appearances, Adam quietly concedes the argument just before loudly declaring victory in contradiction to his earlier statement.

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