Iraq violence update, November 2008

The numbers from September, with the numbers coming from Icasualities.org and the graphs by me (forgive the crude renderings--I'm working with primitive graphics programs).



The numbers of dead for Iraqi civilians and security forces continue to trend lower. This is a mild surprise given the relaxation of travel restrictions in Baghdad, though it is also important to point out that violence in Baghdad did increase in some respects according to news reports, as with a several bombings during one day late in October.



The mainstream press easily beat me in reporting the very low fatality total for coalition troops. I could hazard the guess that Obama's proposals for withdrawing troops might help spur such reporting. With fatalities lower, one might reason, the time for phased withdrawal has arrived. Icasualties.org performed a late update on its figures, so my numbers differ slightly from mainstream news accounts derived from the same source.

I've stuck with the convention of showing 13 months at a time, which enables me to show a detailed graph that clearly shows recent trends. Long term trends are no less important, however. This month, given the impending change of power in Washington, I'm showing a long-term graph for coalition fatalities. Also note that I got around to graphing the "non-hostile" deaths as determined by the Pentagon and duly reported at Icasualties.org.

Non-hostile deaths have no readily apparent correlation to hostilities or hostile deaths. I found myself amazed at the number, along with fact that the media haven't bothered to crunch the numbers much at all.

According to my count, over 20 percent of reported deaths were not caused by enemy hostilities (if a U.S. soldier murdered another U.S. soldier, which has happened, it would be counted as a non-hostile fatality).



The fourth graph is remarkable, in retrospect. It represents an amazing turnaround in Iraq. The surge strategy was chosen in January and the troop levels increased gradually, not reaching their peak until the summer. The strategy was not implemented all at once. Rather, it was done region by region starting in Anbar province where the surge tactics were already in place. As Anbar stabilized, the strategy was employed in other locations including the Baghdad region.


The spike in May 2008, of course, represents the crackdown on the Sadrist militias. That move was not part of the surge strategy, strictly speaking, since Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initiated the confrontation to both test Iraqi security forces and to politically marginalize the Sadrists. Al-Maliki accomplished his goal in spades, and inspired considerable unity in Iraq by confronting his own religious sect, the majority Shia. Sunni Muslims in Iraq took note.

May victory in Iraq endure whatever a President Obama decides to do.

Mid-month Iraq fatality update, October 2008

The data for the chart come from icasualties.org.



The general downward trend of fatalities for coalition troops remains obvious. Inside the numbers, however, the story is slightly different. As of today, icasualties counts eight fatalities total. Of those eight, five were designated as due to hostilities. That is a low number, but there is some perspective to add.

At the time of last month's mid-month update, only two were designated as resulting from hostilities. By the end up the month the total had risen to eight. Projecting the October mid-month figure to predict the entire month suggests we'll end up in the neighborhood of 10. I suppose it could be said that projections suggest that coalition fatalities will increase by a quarter this month. While that's true, such handling of trends with smaller numbers tends to mean little. As I pointed out last month (and I will continue to do so), when the numbers get this small they will tend to fluctuate without necessarily establishing any informative trend.

I expect coalition fatalities to stay low even with the barriers coming down in Baghdad, mainly because nationals have taken over the bulk of security operations.

It remains to be seen whether an Obama administration re-emboldens AQI or influences (unintentionally, to be sure) Shiite radicals to step up their operations.

It also remains to be seen how well Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki welcomes Sunnis into a nationalistic unity.

Suicide bombings boost body count in Iraq for July

Iraqi police say three suspects have been arrested over a suicide bombing during a protest rally in Kirkuk that killed at least 25 people.

The attack was part of a wave of violence that claimed the lives of at least 56 people across Iraq overnight.

(abc.net.au)

This set of suicide attacks resembles a concerted effort on its face. The enemy, perhaps AQI, used female suicide bombers in Baghdad and went for big crowds. The attacks in Kirkuk, as described above, also targeted large crowds.

I got to wondering. Do terrorist types hoping to prolong the Iraq War look at casualty counts and see the political implications? I certainly do. Why wouldn't a terrorist get it in his head that high civilian casualty numbers can aid his cause politically?

The civilian death from violence numbers at icasualties.org were prepared to continue their dropping trend--that trend might yet continue for July despite this rash of suicide bombings. Is it possible that the enemy conducted the attacks primarily to boost the numbers?

While I would admit that it is probably more likely that the bombings were intended to stir up sectarian strife as with the Golden Mosque bombing years ago, the possibility is not far-fetched. I think it likely that the enemy keeps in mind the way casualty numbers impact their aims in terms of national and international politics, even if it is not the primary motivation for bombing attacks.

Those of us (I have to count myself) who use civilian body counts to measure success in the war may well end up helping to motivate our enemies to kill more civilians.

Mid-month Iraq casualty update

The numbers so far from Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (icasualties.org) continue to support the success of the surge strategy.

My mid-month update will include only one graph since most of the raw numbers make for useless graphs. For example, graphing the total number of documented Iraqi security and civilian deaths based on a fifteen day total does little other than provide a misleading graphic picture.

The one graph I intend to use for mid-month updates is the average number of coalition troops killed per day. That number remains significant and is less misleading than a running total, especially if the graph carries an explanation.


The downward trend at the end of the graph is obvious. The caveat is that the latter half of July might feature 50 U.S. troops killed and inflate the average back to an average comparable to that in September of 2007. On the other hand, the average cannot sink significantly below .2 deaths per day without finding that some of the deaths already counted did not take place.

The trend suggests that July will stand as the safest month yet for U.S. troops, at least in terms of service deaths. And if we hunt inside the numbers a bit the picture is actually somewhat better. Of the six deaths counted in the first half of July 2008, two were the recovered bodies of soldiers abducted over a year ago. The tragedy of those deaths does not shrink as a result of it being old news, but it is worth noting that the deaths did not occur as a result of recent violence. A third U.S. death is listed as not occurring because of hostile fire, so again violent acts of insurgents or militias probably cannot be blamed.

Icasualties.org also has a graphic (top left) indicating the average number of deaths during various phases of the war. It occurred to me that the graphic potentially provides a skewed view of the results of the surge. Icasualties counts six phases of the war, with the most recent the "surge or troop escalation" starting of Feb 1, 2007 and continuing through the present. At present, the average deaths per day for the surge phase stand at 2.06. That counts as the second-lowest total for any of the six phases, but the graph I've posted prompts an additional observation. The average deaths figure for every month following Gen. Petraeus' September report to Congress has fallen below the average for the least violent listed stage of the war (1.9).

The icasulties.org figures for civilian and security forces deaths likewise reflect a shrinking trend. Doubling the current numbers (138 as of today) to estimate the total for the end of the month agrees with the picture of a more peaceful Iraq.

Iraq violence update

As usual, I have used information from icasualties.org (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count) to develop some graphs reflecting trends in Iraq violence. I've added a third tracking graph, this one representing the average number of coalition troops killed per day over the course of each month. The monthly average makes early returns more useful, in that a mid-month average (right now for June 2008 the average is 1.23) can be reasonably compared to the previous month's average.





On the third graph, note that the beginning point is January of 2007. As one might expect, the yellow graph closely shadows the blue graph for the corresponding period.