ARLINGTON, Va. — The Marine Corps has decided it needs far fewer Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles than it originally thought it would, Corps officials said.
Known as MRAPs, the vehicles have V-shaped hulls meant to deflect blasts from underneath and have proven to withstand roadside bomb blasts much better than up-armored Humvees.
The Corps initially asked for 3,700 MRAPs, but it now says it only needs 2,300 of the vehicles, Marine spokesman Maj. Jay Delarosa said in an e-mail Friday.
(Stars and Stripes)
Whoops.
This is a big hit for MRAP manufacturers. News is coming out already about Force Protection's
shares dropping, and the news isn't really any better for companies like Ceradyne and Navistar that put considerable dollars into designing and preparing for the production of MRAPs.
It looks like the MRAP craze was a blip in history--an expensive blip that will end up providing quite a bit of useful information for the building of future military vehicles, but produced vehicles that may turn obsolete in just a few short years.
Those who argued that MRAPs were ill-suited to the counterinsurgency tactics of the surge will find something to bolster their view, but the willingness of the United States to produce MRAPs probably helped discourage the insurgency even if their widespread use ultimately wasn't needed to ensure victory.
As for David DeCamp's
report on MRAPs that I critiqued months ago, it looks like the insurgents have run into a shortage of machine shops or something.
Instead of demonstrating America's war fighting prowess, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle - MRAP in military parlance - illustrates how even a wealthy industrial power can struggle to wage war against a nimble and unconventional enemy. America relies on a slow defense bureaucracy, politicians to approve spending and commercial industry to build the better MRAP. Insurgents get their hands on an explosive, go to a machine shop for changes, and trigger it with a common cell phone.
(St. Petersburg Times)
Or maybe they can't afford cell phone service?
Reducing EFP usage would thus be more complicated than simply exerting tighter border controls. Factories would have to be located, and killing or capturing enemy combatants who possess the knowledge to make the devices would certainly contribute.
Bottom line: There's no reason to despair that the insurgents can't be beaten, nor to fear that they will keep the upper hand in battlefield tactics.
(sublime bloviations)
As noted, MRAPs will probably have a very limited use in the military as the situation in Iraq continues to cool. The heavier vehicles may get modified for special functions such as mine clearing. The lightest vehicles, the Caiman 4x4s, may have a ghost of a chance of future tactical deployment--they have a reputation for reasonably good off-road performance.
The stage is set for the JLTV program to produce a mobile and protected replacement for the Humvee. Ceradyne's Bull will draw few orders if any; the whole MRAP II solicitation will likely turn into a mere modification of MRAP I, with no long term future for the program.
All is not lost for Force Protection. The Cheetah was intended from the start to replace the Humvee. It just remains to be seen who produces the best vehicle with the best support infrastructure.
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