Free will and determinism

For a long time the issue of free will and determinism has remained one of my favorite philosophical subjects. I greatly enjoy debating the issue.

I never accepted the arguments put forth in favor of a lack of human freedom based on foreknowledge, and over time I've learned to express those objections effectively, with a considerable debt to philosopher Norman Swartz.

So why write on a topic that most find as dry as moon dust?

I've written quite a bit on the topic, but it's spread all over the Internet. One post I produced for the CFI discussion forum summarized my argument in fairly tidy (formal) form.

The argument tries to address the contention that Libertarian Free Will is incoherent, along with the suggestion that free will is lost since we cannot change what we have done. The definition that leads off the post illustrates the bankruptcy of those arguments. "J" represents one making a choice and X represents an option. The symbol "~" means "not," so option "~X" represents any option or option that is not X.

LFW: J at time t is able to select X xor ~X, where the selection correlates to J’s intentions.

“Select” will be taken to automatically correlate with J’s intentions in the examples below.

Note: It may be argued that more is required to create a thorough distinction between LFW and CFW. I’ll consider that issue negotiable depending on the objections, but meanwhile I would argue that the ability to select X xor ~X is sufficient to distinguish the two while the correlation with intention suffices to equal CFW notions of control.

Remember that “xor” means one or the other but not both.

If J at time t is able to select X but not ~X, then J’s behavior is identical with causally determined behavior.

Behavior identical with causally determined behavior is causally determined behavior (principle of identity).

If J at time t is able to select X but not ~X, then J’s behavior is causally determined.

If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X, then LFW is possibly true in the example.

If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X is possibly true in the example, then causal determinism is not assumed in the example.
If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X is not possibly true in the example, then causal determinism is assumed in the example.

If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X, then X and ~X are accessible options at t.
If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X and J selects X, then ~X is an accessible option at t.
If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X and P selects ~X, then X is an accessible option at t.
If J at time t is able to select X xor ~X and P selects X xor ~X at t, then X and ~X are accessible options at t.

If one has understood the above statements, it should be clear that selecting one option over another does not inherently result in the inaccessibility nor impossibility of the option not selected.

Possible worlds representation
p=possible
a=actual

p(J selects X at t) and p(J selects ~X at t)
that is, worlds X and ~X could possibly exist, though the instantiation (actuality) of either is contingent on the selection of p at t. Causal determinism is not assumed, LFW is assumed for the sake of argument.

If J selects X at t then a(J selects X at t) is also p(J selects X at t)
(possibility is a necessary precondition of actuality, nothing impossible is actual; everything actual is also possible)

Likewise,
If J selects ~X at t then a(J selects ~X at t) is also p(J selects X at t).

In other words, if (possible world X) is actual then (possible world X) is both possible and actual.
It should go without saying that if possible world ~X is possible at t (necessary to avoid assuming causal determinism), then the possible world ~X remains possible at t even if possible world X is actual. The modal fallacy tends to lead to a misunderstanding of this point, as “possible” is misunderstood as “might in fact be the actual world” instead of merely understood as the definition of “possible” (could be actual). People mistakenly conclude that if X is actual then ~X is not possible.

Following the above, if J at time t selects X where J at time t is able to select X xor ~X, J has fulfilled all the reasonable expectations of a LFW choice. Nothing inherent in the selection process itself subtracts from LFW unless we count the prior assumption of causal determinism. Which would be cheating.

The argument is edited slightly from its original form to omit reference to those making opposing arguments on the CFI message board. I also finished changing each "X" to an "A"--something I thought I'd already done!

Criticism is welcome, and a visit to Norman Swartz's philosophy notes should help clear up questions about necessary, possible and actual worlds.

Has Daniel Dennett got a screw loose?

Many atheists appear to put great stock in the ideas of philosopher Daniel Dennett.

Though I've yet to read one of his books, I've read quite a few opinions regarding his ideas and I've sought out his own comments. And his comments make him look like a crackpot.

So, what am I talking about? Check out some comments Dennett made to Reason Magazine, for example.

Reason: A response might be that you're just positing a more complicated form of determinism. A bird may be more "determined" than we are, but we nevertheless are determined.

Dennett: So what? Determinism is not a problem. What you want is freedom, and freedom and determinism are entirely compatible. In fact, we have more freedom if determinism is true than if it isn't.

(Reason Magazine)

The interviewer seems to use "determined" to mean 100% causally determined. If Dennett takes the term the same way then his last statement requires a good amount of justification.

The next exchange:

Reason: Why?

Dennett: Because if determinism is true, then there's less randomness. There's less unpredictability. To have freedom, you need the capacity to make reliable judgments about what's going to happen next, so you can base your action on it.

If determinism is true in the way the interviewer meant it then there is effectively zero randomness. Dennett appears to have equivocated. When he goes on to talk about the "capacity" for reliable judgments he trades in a term loaded with indeterministic connotations. A causally determined thinker has only one accessible future (in a causally determined universe).

Dennett had gone on from that point to use an illustration about running across a field with the possibility of being struck by lightning. Without causal determinism, Dennett offers, the lightning is completely random so there's no planning for it. And that's true. In an indeterministic world you wouldn't be able to count on the field being there to run across, either. But that seems to be Dennett distracting from the issue, whether intentionally or otherwise. The issue, from what I could tell, was deterministic vs. indeterministic thought. So let's put a deterministic thinker before the lightning field. He is causally determined to choose either a good strategy to cross the field or a bad strategy. If preceding states of matter dictated that he would choose a bad strategy for crossing the field, did that field-crosser have the type of freedom Dennett talks about? Did he have the capacity to make a reliable judgment about what happens next?

If he had that capacity, then why the bad strategy?

What "capacity" did the field-crosser with the good strategy possess other than the same ability the poor-strategy field-crosser had (to do as preceding states of matter dictated)?

Dennett's own words make him look like he judges freedom based on outcomes.

It wouldn't surprise me if Dennett drew some withering criticism in the professional literature ...

In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable.
(Synthese)

Note: I went with a slightly less inflammatory title after a moment of reflection. Even in question form connecting Dennett with "crackpot" was a bit rude.

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