Voice of caution regarding military expenditures

The same amount of money expected to be spent on MRAPs could have bought 10 Virginia-class submarines, three Ford-class aircraft carriers, half of the planned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program or even 100 C-17 airlifters, he noted.

While there is broad agreement that the Army and Marine Corps fielded too few MRAPs earlier in the war, the risk now is that the Pentagon may produce far too many, Krepinevich and Wood concluded.

(Aviation Week)

There's the rub. The focus on MRAP procurement saddles the military with a large number of heavy vehicles with limited tactical utility. The Bull MRAP seemed to typify the imbalance of the program, as the version submitted for MRAP II appeared to sacrifice agility and speed in favor of maximized force protection. Lessons learned in Iraq and through the MRAP development process should produce good results from the JLTV development program.

Particularly in light of the recent dramatic signs of success in Iraq, we should look very carefully at limiting expenditures for vehicles that may not see much use in the future version of our armed services.

I don't pretend to know where the line should be drawn, but I'm at least pretty sure there's a line there somewhere.

*****