Waterboarding in the news

News about waterboarding has spiked this week amid revelations that the CIA destroyed videotaped waterboarding sessions.

The most interesting part of the Reuters account occurred on the third of three pages (a pox on the inverted pyramid!).

He said the techniques were "lawful, safe and effective," and approved by the Justice Department and executive branch. But the CIA wanted to make sure it was within the law, "So, on its own, the CIA began to videotape interrogations," he said.

He said the CIA stopped the taping because officials concluded it was not needed as a backup to the agency's other means of documenting interrogations. It destroyed the tapes after making sure they had no more intelligence value and were not relevant to any inquiries.

(Reuters)

I've known too many journalists to trust their paraphrasing, and in the above account two paraphrases appear to work against each other.
1) CIA taped to makes sure it was within the law
2) CIA stopped taping because taping not needed to back up other documentation of interrogations

If they're taping to make sure the technique is within the law, they really only need to tape a given technique once. If that's the sole reason they're doing the taping then no additional reason is needed to stop taping. The second paraphrase implies that the taping was done to provide backup documentation.

Thus, the statement that the CIA stopped the taping because the additional documentation was not needed implies another purpose for the taping.

If I'm the editor I have the reporter(s) clarify that point.

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Looking closer at Marine MRAP cutback

A tiny bit more information regarding the Marines' cutback on MRAP orders:

Conway said cutting the Marines' MRAP order may speed up purchase of the vehicles for the Army.

The Marines still have a use for the smallest variant of the vehicle as an engineer combat vehicle, even in an expeditionary environment, Conway said. The service has tried for 20 years to develop an engineer combat vehicle, he noted. The MRAP could fill that bill with 360-degree protection and its V-shaped hull, which directs shrapnel away from riders.

(Military.com)

The first paragraph: Speed up purchase of the vehicles for the Army? The Army is likely to get MRAPs in the field more quickly, but ordering more of them seems like an open question subject to considerable doubt.

The second paragraph: The Marines may have a use for the "smallest variant" of the vehicle. That could mean the Cat I generally or it could mean the Armor Holdings (BAE Systems) Caiman particularly. The Cat I Caiman, from what I can tell, is the smallest of the MRAPs that have been delivered. Force Protection's Cheetah (or PVI's Protector) might also qualify for Marine service, as both are purported to have MRAP-type protections built into a smaller and faster vehicle.

That's as good an excuse as any to finally post a Cheetah pic.

clipped from www.army-technology.com

Go here and you can see a short promotional video at the Force Protection Web site.

Speaking of the Force Protection Web site, the images there reflect some subtle exterior changes to the Cheetah. Note the broader grille opening, and some changes to both the front and rear fenders. Not to mention the considerably different bumper.

clipped from www.forceprotection.net

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Has Daniel Dennett got a screw loose?

Many atheists appear to put great stock in the ideas of philosopher Daniel Dennett.

Though I've yet to read one of his books, I've read quite a few opinions regarding his ideas and I've sought out his own comments. And his comments make him look like a crackpot.

So, what am I talking about? Check out some comments Dennett made to Reason Magazine, for example.

Reason: A response might be that you're just positing a more complicated form of determinism. A bird may be more "determined" than we are, but we nevertheless are determined.

Dennett: So what? Determinism is not a problem. What you want is freedom, and freedom and determinism are entirely compatible. In fact, we have more freedom if determinism is true than if it isn't.

(Reason Magazine)

The interviewer seems to use "determined" to mean 100% causally determined. If Dennett takes the term the same way then his last statement requires a good amount of justification.

The next exchange:

Reason: Why?

Dennett: Because if determinism is true, then there's less randomness. There's less unpredictability. To have freedom, you need the capacity to make reliable judgments about what's going to happen next, so you can base your action on it.

If determinism is true in the way the interviewer meant it then there is effectively zero randomness. Dennett appears to have equivocated. When he goes on to talk about the "capacity" for reliable judgments he trades in a term loaded with indeterministic connotations. A causally determined thinker has only one accessible future (in a causally determined universe).

Dennett had gone on from that point to use an illustration about running across a field with the possibility of being struck by lightning. Without causal determinism, Dennett offers, the lightning is completely random so there's no planning for it. And that's true. In an indeterministic world you wouldn't be able to count on the field being there to run across, either. But that seems to be Dennett distracting from the issue, whether intentionally or otherwise. The issue, from what I could tell, was deterministic vs. indeterministic thought. So let's put a deterministic thinker before the lightning field. He is causally determined to choose either a good strategy to cross the field or a bad strategy. If preceding states of matter dictated that he would choose a bad strategy for crossing the field, did that field-crosser have the type of freedom Dennett talks about? Did he have the capacity to make a reliable judgment about what happens next?

If he had that capacity, then why the bad strategy?

What "capacity" did the field-crosser with the good strategy possess other than the same ability the poor-strategy field-crosser had (to do as preceding states of matter dictated)?

Dennett's own words make him look like he judges freedom based on outcomes.

It wouldn't surprise me if Dennett drew some withering criticism in the professional literature ...

In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable.
(Synthese)

Note: I went with a slightly less inflammatory title after a moment of reflection. Even in question form connecting Dennett with "crackpot" was a bit rude.

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"Action" pic of Caiman MRAP

It's the Cat II version, straight from the BAE Systems press kit page. Still no videos available last I checked.

clipped from www.baesystemspresskit.com

"You'll probably tell me that I, as a moral relativist, can't condemn Hitler."

The fun continues as a pair of philosophical naturalists (not to preclude narrower identification as physicalists or something) have stopped by to address that problem of morality from their world view perspective.

The line I put in the title was the money line from visitor "stillnotking," who also goes as SN King when I want to use fewer characters. Plus I can thereafter refer to him (?) as "King" without sowing confusion.

But enough chit-chat. Let's review King's most recent comment. The first portion of his comment had him cheerfully admitting moral relativism (it's conceivable he is unaware I had been making the point that the atheist's moral position makes arguments against a god based on moral indignation seem ill-founded when given the presupposition of causal determinism).

Now, moral standards are relative but not arbitrary. Over the course of millennia we (and by "we" I mean both our genes and our accumulated culture) have figured out that some moral standards work better than others at ensuring stability and prosperity for as many people as possible. The ethics of peace, tolerance, respect for individual rights, etc. are no less effective for lacking metaphysical backing.

The above position statement apparently takes for granted that "stability and prosperity for as many people as possible" serves as a moral axiom. But if King is correct that morality is relative, then that moral directive is no less relative than any other.

Then he brings up the odd notion of the effectiveness of ethics. Given the presupposition of moral relativism, what does that even mean, other than using ethics as a means to whatever ends you find attractive, be it death to the infidel or rain gauges for everyone? Someone explain to King that incoherence is not a positive aspect of a worldview description.

On to the punch line:

Next you'll probably tell me that I, as a moral relativist, can't condemn Hitler. Of course I can condemn him. I can do my individual best to ensure that I continue living in a society that condemns him. But imagining that I have some metaphysical mandate to condemn him does not help my case, and is ultimately foolish, like imagining that I should eat carrots because I need more "carrot spirits" rather than because vitamin A is good for me.

It's not that King can't condemn Hitler, it's that he can't do it consistent with his own moral relativism. Knowing that his morality is no better than Hitler's he condemns Hitler anyway.

What principle guides the morality of a King? Personal taste.

Oh, and what about that claim that his ethics are not arbitrary?
I believe that this is the definition in play (King can correct me if I'm wrong):

4. capricious; unreasonable; unsupported: an arbitrary demand for payment.

The claim is akin to stating that a throw of the dice is not arbitrary. After all, given the starting position of the dice, the rotation, the velocity, etcetera ...

I'll go collect the rent tomorrow. But only if I roll double sixes. Nothing arbitrary about that, is there? And if it doesn't rain then the rent is double.

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Josh Strawn weighs in on morality and determinism

Josh Strawn, whom I engaged in conversation following his commentary on the debate between Dinesh D'Souza and Christopher Hitchens, has continued the dialog in the commentary thread to a subsequent post by me on the subject of free will and determinism.

I'll engage the conversation with a fresh post, since I see no need to relegate the issue to a commentary thread.

Bryan, free will can only have meaning in a deterministic framework. What good is the choice to jump or to set a bucket on the ground if one cannot be assured of the deterministic laws of the universe?

Quite true, Josh, but that point offers no help for the argument since libertarian free will is fully compatible with any amount of determinism short of total causal determinism (the decision of the will is the only thing that needs to be free of absolute causal determination).

Put simply, the argument doesn't follow if "deterministic framework" means an assumption of absolute causal determinism. Though I'd certainly welcome arguments to that effect.

Those laws will assure him or her that they will return to the ground after jumping or that the bucket they've put down will stay put, do they not? In order for choice to function, we must be able to depend to some degree on certain outcomes even if there are also a great many elements we can't predict or depend upon.

Right, but that situation should not be confused with absolute causal determinism. If causal determinism were absolute then the assurance you talk about is a non-issue. You'll either come down after jumping or you won't. Either way (if determinism were true) the expectation itself is absolutely a product of preceding states of matter. With luck it matches reality; that is all.

"(C)ausal determinism" is customarily taken as the proposition that all events are the result of casual chains, perhaps allowing one exception at creation. A fallacy of equivocation may easily result if that customary meaning were to drift.

stillnotking is correct, the evidence is uncontroversial and these debates well-trodden; blog comments are not the space to familiarize the unfamiliar with the findings of scientists like Libet or Walter. If you take issue with what is being said, I'd invite you to read the original scientific literature (Libet's papers are not beyond comprehension of the layman).

I argued that experiments such as Libet's are not relevant to prescriptive morality. Mr. Strawn appears to be avoiding that issue in favor of getting embroiled in the details of the experimentation. Science cannot prove or disprove causation. Strawn and King will have to live with that, if either is even willing to address the issue.

In short, the argument that causal determinism is true is no substitute for the argument that a coherent account of prescriptive morality stems therefrom. It is a distraction. A red herring.

Suffice to say, morality does not dissipate once one takes a naturalistic view of the universe, nor does accountability. To suggest this is to suggest by corollary that morality is dependent on an unsupportable fantastical hypothesis anyway, so what have you of the soul's free will then? Hardly more...

Mr. Strawn has some of King's gift for the unsupported assertion.

If morality does not dissipate once on takes on a naturalistic view of the universe, then I have reason to expect a coherent account of it within the parameters of that world view. No number of appeals to Libet will achieve that until Libet crosses over into philosophy and makes an argument to that effect--even then the argument is subject to debate.

One you realize that God and the soul do not have the meanings you once took for granted, you then are faced with the more difficult (and more fascinating) task of understanding the whats and whys of morality on the basis of rational and/or scientific investigation.

What meanings for God and the soul do I take for granted, I wonder?

I expected better from Mr. Strawn. He offers no naturalistic account of moral responsibility--but he appears perfectly willing to refer me to other authorities. If I likewise refer my arguments to Kane then where does that leave us?

Just because those who engage you in conversation don't feel the need to rehash arguments from Leibniz to Dostoyevsky, Locke to Strawson, or Spinoza to Searle hardly means they've failed the argument.

Indeed. It does, however, mean that those who engage me in conversation have offered no argument of their own. I think that's significant. I suspect it is the case that naturalists do not understand the arguments they invoke (nor frequently those they attack), though I'm prepared to abandon the suspicion if a professed naturalist/physicalist demonstrates an understanding of the arguments without passing the buck.

Apparently Josh Strawn has removed himself from the pool of persons willing to demonstrate such an understanding.

Given the appearance that Mr. Strawn was prepared to confuse the truth of causal determinism as a metaphysical framework with the partial truth of causal determinism, I have reason to suspect that Strawn was among those who do not understand the arguments.


Apologies to Mr. Strawn for my commission of a typo in the headline. I omitted the "r" but that has since been remedied.

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Liberals for censorship

A recent visitor to this site, the previously noted "libhomo" (goes by Godless Liberal Homo at his own blog), insisted that government figures cannot be trusted and that violence in Iraq has not subsided.

I paid a visit to his blog, found a post concerning the issue of violence in Iraq and found yet another liberal blogger who prefers to get the last word via censorship.

I don't go looking for these people, mind you. That is, folks who delete comments to keep the content at their blog sufficiently pure. Maybe I should take screenshots as a matter of routine. My timing was good, though. I didn't get a copy of the first comment that was deleted, but the perpetrator was caught in the act later on.



In the "This post has been deleted by the blog administrator" spot, I had pointed out that the abandonment of random sampling did not, as libhom ridiculously claimed "The exception for the most violent areas means that the numbers in the Lancet study are minimums." It means that the study is not scientific, just as when I do a survey of spiders in the nearby woods and choose my sample area other than randomly (like if I choose a nice spidery spot to do my counting).

I also provided a quotation from a pollster quoted in the Wall Street Journal regarding the small number of clusters used in the study.

What better way to refute the criticism than make it disappear!

I followed up with another comment while still under the impression that I was engaged in a good faith discussion.

Before-and-afters (click images to enlarge):




Now you see it.



Now you don't. It's like magic!


Note: Traded out .png images for .jpg since the former didn't work out so well.

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Reuters headline set to fuel fever swamp (Updated)

Report contradicts Bush on Iran nuclear program

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A new U.S. intelligence report says Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and it remains on hold, contradicting the Bush administration's earlier assertion that Tehran was intent on developing a bomb.

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on Monday could undermine U.S. efforts to convince other world powers to agree on a third package of U.N. sanctions against Iran for defying demands to halt uranium enrichment activities.

(Reuters)

Is Bush the story here?

Bush is the story if he contradicts the intelligence given him from the intelligence community.

If Bush is relaying information from the intelligence community as he gets it, then Bush isn't the story. The change in the evaluation of the intelligence community is the story. But this Reuters account doesn't give any evidence that was the case.

Administration officials denied the new NIE had exposed a serious intelligence lapse but could not explain how agencies failed to detect for four years that Iran's nuclear weapons program had been halted.

Perhaps the press should consider that the new intelligence isn't necessarily better than the old intelligence. Two years from now we might hear that Iran resumed its attempts to develop a nuclear weapon. Perhaps the story will again emphasize a conflict with the administration's statements based on previous intelligence while noting yet another intelligence failure.

Update:
Norman Podhoretz writes down in some detail what I thought about in general terms.


Hat tip to Power Line.

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No cee-gar for Chavez

CARACAS, Venezuela - Humbled by his first electoral defeat ever, President Hugo Chavez said Monday he may have been too ambitious in asking voters to let him stand indefinitely for re-election and endorse a huge leap to a socialist state.

"I understand and accept that the proposal I made was quite profound and intense," he said after voters narrowly rejected the sweeping constitutional reforms by 51 percent to 49 percent.
(AP, via Yahoo!News)

Chavez won't immediately move Venezuela into the Cuban mold.

But don't be too sure he's done grasping for dictatorial power.

Early Monday, Baduel reminded fellow Venezuelans that Chavez still wields special decree powers thanks to a pliant National Assembly packed with his supporters.

"These results can't be recognized as a victory," Baduel told reporters,

Baduel, who as defense minister helped Chavez turn back the 2002 putsch, said Venezuela can only be properly united by convening a popularly elected assembly to rewrite its constitution.

Where's that feature story on Chavez and Venezuela we've been waiting for from Sean Penn?

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About.com on atheism and morality

I've had a rollicking good time discussing morality with Josh Strawn, Adam Lee and Stephen Lawrence (the latter at an online forum), and since each of them has effectively suspended the attempt to respond I've gone out to find another opinion from their side of the issue.

Austin Cline writes about atheism and agnosticism for About.com, and sometimes he writes a pretty decent article. While looking for a substitute for the missing three above I discovered a Cline entry called "Myth: Without God's Absolute Standards, There's No Basis for Good Moral Choices."

As it has long been my position that absolutes are difficult, if not impossible, to generate from an atheistic point of view, the title certainly grabbed my interest. How would Cline go about dispelling the myth?

Cline begins, more or less, by wondering whether it is necessary to assume that absolute morality depends on the commands of some outside source. Not surprisingly, he doubts that it is necessary. I'd be inclined to agree with him, since divine command theory is not the only option for theists.

But immediately after that, Cline goes right off the deep end. No kidding.

I could assume instead that the only "correct" morality is one which enhances the good while minimizes suffering.

Many religious theists might respond by asking what reason there is to assume that we should enhance the good while minimizing suffering, but here they would be relying upon the assumption that the only good reason to arrive at such a conclusion is if we are ordered to do so by an outside, superior force. You can't prove the validity of a position by assuming it's (sic) validity as part of your argument.
(About.com)

1. Cline says he can assume that the only correct morality is one that enhances good while minimizing suffering.
2. Cline claims that the theist who questions the assumption is assuming that the only good reason for the assumption is, in effect, divine command.
3. Cline says the validity of a position cannot be proved by assuming its validity.

As if it weren't enough that Cline illogically links the objection to his assumption to a theistic assumption of divine command theory, he gives every appearance of violating his third point with his first. It seems to me that the objection to his first point follows from Cline's own observation in the third point. If Cline is not allowed to assume the validity of his first point, then on what basis should we accept it?

Adherence to divine command appears to have nothing to do with it.

Cline finishes the entry with the apparent assumption that his premise is valid and keeps castigating divine command theorists who will assuredly fail to appreciate the grandeur of the atheist's moral solution ("They are, in effect, impervious to any counter-arguments on this issue").

Funny stuff.

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