About.com on atheism and morality

I've had a rollicking good time discussing morality with Josh Strawn, Adam Lee and Stephen Lawrence (the latter at an online forum), and since each of them has effectively suspended the attempt to respond I've gone out to find another opinion from their side of the issue.

Austin Cline writes about atheism and agnosticism for About.com, and sometimes he writes a pretty decent article. While looking for a substitute for the missing three above I discovered a Cline entry called "Myth: Without God's Absolute Standards, There's No Basis for Good Moral Choices."

As it has long been my position that absolutes are difficult, if not impossible, to generate from an atheistic point of view, the title certainly grabbed my interest. How would Cline go about dispelling the myth?

Cline begins, more or less, by wondering whether it is necessary to assume that absolute morality depends on the commands of some outside source. Not surprisingly, he doubts that it is necessary. I'd be inclined to agree with him, since divine command theory is not the only option for theists.

But immediately after that, Cline goes right off the deep end. No kidding.

I could assume instead that the only "correct" morality is one which enhances the good while minimizes suffering.

Many religious theists might respond by asking what reason there is to assume that we should enhance the good while minimizing suffering, but here they would be relying upon the assumption that the only good reason to arrive at such a conclusion is if we are ordered to do so by an outside, superior force. You can't prove the validity of a position by assuming it's (sic) validity as part of your argument.
(About.com)

1. Cline says he can assume that the only correct morality is one that enhances good while minimizing suffering.
2. Cline claims that the theist who questions the assumption is assuming that the only good reason for the assumption is, in effect, divine command.
3. Cline says the validity of a position cannot be proved by assuming its validity.

As if it weren't enough that Cline illogically links the objection to his assumption to a theistic assumption of divine command theory, he gives every appearance of violating his third point with his first. It seems to me that the objection to his first point follows from Cline's own observation in the third point. If Cline is not allowed to assume the validity of his first point, then on what basis should we accept it?

Adherence to divine command appears to have nothing to do with it.

Cline finishes the entry with the apparent assumption that his premise is valid and keeps castigating divine command theorists who will assuredly fail to appreciate the grandeur of the atheist's moral solution ("They are, in effect, impervious to any counter-arguments on this issue").

Funny stuff.

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