Moonbattery at the Guardian

Terrorism News alerted me to an embarrassingly bad piece of journalism over at the Guardian.

It was so bad that I took it for the work of the TN folks (they do less to distinguish quoted material from original material than most).

The author of the piece was the Guardian's own Julian Borger, their Washington correspondent.

Here's the problematic part of the story:

"to [simulate attacks], the centre will have to produce and stockpile the worlds most lethal bacteria and viruses, which is forbidden by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention."

Borger doesn't mention that Article I of the convention provides for stockpiling of such agents, however. Here's the text of Article I:

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types or in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.
2. Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict.

(source)

Borger seems to have made his own judgment that the proposed center would contravene the convention. Journalists usually find an expert source to render such judgments. The text of the convention makes his determination seem anything but clear-cut, since it prohibits development and stockpiling except where justified for prophylactic and protective purposes. It is astonishing that a professional journalist could write the story without mentioning this stipulation of Article I, and astonishing that his editor wouldn't ask him to find an expert to offer the proposed judgment.

Borger makes it sound as though there would never be any justification for possessing such agents at all, and he reinforces that impression by mentioning another feature of the convention: "The biological weapons convention stipulates that the signatories must not 'develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain' biological weapons, and does not distinguish between offensive and defensive intentions."
That's true as far as it goes, but the very portion of the convention from which Borger quoted does make clear that the convention distinguishes between military purposes and prophylactic/protective purposes. Borger looks as though he is intentionally trying to mislead his audience. If he was able to quote from Article I without noticing its allowance for protective research, then he is an utter incompetent. If he was aware of that allowance while writing that "defensive intentions" did not justify stockpiling the biological agents and toxins then he is likewise incompetent if he's not deliberately trying to deceive.

It seems that "defensive intentions" means the use of weaponized agents for military defense. There is no other way to coherently understand the convention. It is for that reason, I believe, that Borger offered no expert to condemn the US for violating the convention with the operation of proposed facility. He couldn't find an expert who was willing to make such an outlandish claim.

***

When I first encountered the Borger piece, I left a comment over at TN.
"_H_" defended the article.

_H_ cites Article III, which prohibits signatories from helping other states acquire the materials mentioned in Article I. He apparently means to suggest that Article III bars a state from developing any such agents, saying "It would be a little silly to imply that such states do not include yourself." Article III itself, however, presupposes possession of such agents since the first clause prevents "transfer" of the agents to those other parties.
So, I guess I'm silly for supposing that the convention prohibits the US from transferring the agents to itself from itself.

Article III in no way contradicts the justification under Article I for using biological agents and toxins for prophylactic, preventive, or peaceful purposes.

_H_ next turns to article IV in his effort to support Borger.
Article IV instructs signatories to take "any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the convention."
Again, nothing in article IV contradicts the allowance for prophylactic and preventive research found in article I.

Article IV seems designed clearly to prohibit a signatory from allowing private individuals or organizations from conducting by proxy activities prohibited on the part of the signatory. _H_ has a slightly different take, however:
"So clearly stockpiling is illegal whether for defensive or offensive means."
In other words, we can throw out the provision for prophylaxis or preventive purposes based on article IV.
So, why is the provision stuck in there in the first place, if _H_ is correct?

The funniest part is when _H_ quotes Borger as if Borger is the last word:

the article clearly states to do so, the centre will have to produce and stockpile the world's most lethal bacteria and viruses, which is forbidden by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
(discussion thread)

That's credulity at its finest.


Note: I located a piece hosted by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation that Borger may have used as a(n uncredited) source. That organization makes considerable to-do about US insistence on "defensive purposes" (i.e., prophylactic and preventive) in light of the convention prohibition on the use of biological and toxic agents for defensive military action.
See here.

The long and short of it is that the CACNP opts for the same blurring between the use of such agents for defensive military action and the use of such agents to research protection for its people (not excluding the military).
The CACNP doesn't try to interpret the statements of the Department of Homeland Security in light of the convention. Rather, they seem to try to make it seem ominous that the DHS doesn't take the time to spell things out in distinguishing between "defensive purposes" and the use of offensive weapons with the motive of defense.

The CACNP offers to make available the correspondence relating to the issue, and I've taken them up on the offer.