War strategy in Afghanistan

The McClatchy folks have printed a story about the ground game in Afghanistan. The story deals with the issue of more troops, counterinsurgency strategy and NATO.

So why are more troops required?

Some U.S. commanders have complained privately for years that after President Bush diverted resources and troops to Iraq they lacked the manpower to conduct an effective counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, especially in the Taliban's southern heartland.

"An increase in troops . . . is absolutely necessary, albeit insufficient to alone stabilize Afghanistan," said a U.S. defense official who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to comment publicly. "We can lose Afghanistan for too little of securing the people."

Hey, great! If you stay anonymous then you can break the rules and get around the fact that you're not allowed to comment publicly. Let's assume that the report is accurate, however, for the sake of analysis.

In Iraq, the U.S. was criticized for "going it alone." In contrast, the Afghanistan situation is much worse than it might have been because of poor coordination between the troops of various nations. German and Turkish troops in particular have drawn attention because of policies that essentially prevent them from engaging in violence.

Obama favors more troops in Afghanistan because it accords with his narrative of losing focus on the real Islamist threat. I suppose I can be charitable in allowing that he favors more troops in Afghanistan because of the problem we have in squeezing useful help out of European allies and the (recent) requests of U.S. commanders. Whatever his true rationale, it has been braided together with his distraction narrative.

Obama makes himself a target for charges of inconsistency, however. If Iraq has had plenty of time to stand up while we stand down, then what of Afhanistan? The Afghans had a head start on the Iraqis and they're behind. What happened to the Obamish genius of encouraging self-sufficiency by removing the military training wheels?

McCain favors more troops in Afghanistan because of troop requests from U.S. commanders, from what I can judge. Happily for Obama, McCain's change of position on troops for Afghanistan plays into the hands of Democratic election strategists.

It seems that coordination of the NATO effort edges U.S. troop levels in terms of importance to the campaign in Afghanistan. McCain is on the right track in wanting to apply a version of the surge strategy (COIN operations) to Afghanistan, but the McClatchy story notes that increasing troop levels may make things worse if the cohesive strategy continues to lack.

So what's Obama's strategy?

Ending the war is essential to meeting our broader strategic goals, starting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Taliban is resurgent and Al Qaeda has a safe haven. Iraq is not the central front in the war on terrorism, and it never has been. As Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently pointed out, we won’t have sufficient resources to finish the job in Afghanistan until we reduce our commitment to Iraq.

As president, I would pursue a new strategy, and begin by providing at least two additional combat brigades to support our effort in Afghanistan. We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmilitary assistance to accomplish the mission there. I would not hold our military, our resources and our foreign policy hostage to a misguided desire to maintain permanent bases in Iraq.

(The New York Times)

The number of fibs and inaccuracies in the whole of the Obama op-ed was impressive. Beyond telling us that his supposed strategy for Afghanistan is new, Obama literally gives us no detail. Whatever the strategy, it requires more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmiitary assistance to accomplish the mission.

Perhaps if we change the strategy and combine that change with hope, then we will accomplish victory in Afghanistan.

McCain has the more concrete and reasonable proposal by far. Obama, in contrast, never believed that the surge COIN strategy would succeed in Iraq, and apparently continues to believe that its success was a mere stroke of luck (saying even with what he knows now he would have repeated his political opposition to the surge).